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What Role for Islam Today? The Political Islamisation of Pakistani Societyⁱ

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Some sections will be expanded after the conference

ABSTRACT

Islam has always been seen as a central tenet of Pakistani national identity. However, whilst religion played an important role in its creation, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's founding father, conceived of Pakistan originally as a secular democracy. Despite this, many successive governments increasingly used Islam to define Pakistan's national identity. This was particularly but not exclusively the case under Zia-ul-Haq, whose policy of islamisation radicalised Pakistani society between 1977 and 1988. Zia's legacy of sectarian division and an Islamic curriculum still influences contemporary society.

Today two fundamental questions for Pakistani society remain: Which Islam and what role for Islam? Each group has its own definition with no consensus on which is the final version. The characteristic feature of political life of Pakistan has always been the polarity between religious pressure groups and a modernist elite, civilian as well as military, who fundamentally disagree on the answers to both questions. The paper also draws the connection that increased islamisation in Pakistani society has often and is today again engendered by a foreign policy crisis.

This paper will analyse the contemporary scenario of political Islam in contemporary Pakistan, focusing in particular on the following issues: the current education reform process, the role of Islamic parties in Musharraf's government and Pakistan's increasingly difficult domestic and foreign policy with regard to the war on terror.

INTRODUCTION

Islam has always been seen as a central tenet of Pakistani national identity. However whilst religion played an important role in its creation, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's founding father, conceived of Pakistan originally as a secular democracy. Despite this, many successive governments increasingly used Islam to define Pakistan's national identity. This was particularly but not exclusively the case under Zia-ul-Haq, whose policy of islamisation radicalised Pakistani society between 1977 and 1988. Zia's legacy is one of sectarian division as well as an Islamic curriculum across all state schools and still affects society today. Yet the issue of islamisation of the Pakistani society is rather more complex and does not simply follow from the diktat of one military despot. Religion and religious identity were both used as a tool for domestic unity as well as against perceived external threats such as India.ⁱⁱ It is also important to note that foreign

policy crises also helped engender increased islamisation in Pakistani society in a reactive way. So although fundamentally a domestic issue, the islamisation of Pakistani society cannot be dissociated from Pakistan's foreign policy choices, which complicates rather than simplifies any analysis.

Today two fundamental questions for Pakistani society remain: Which Islam and what role for Islam? Each group has its own definition with no consensus on which is the final version and what should be applicable to all. The characteristic feature of political life of Pakistan has always been the polarity between religious pressure groups and a modernist elite, civilian as well as military, who fundamentally disagree on the answers to both questions. The struggle between the modernists and the radicals in Pakistan remains unresolved as both groups claim the memory of Pakistan's founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah.

This paper will engage with the issue of political Islam in contemporary Pakistan focusing in particular on the following issues: the current education reform process, the role of Islamic parties in Musharraf's government and Pakistan's increasingly difficulties in domestic and foreign policy with regard to the war on terror.

FRAMING THE ISSUE IN HISTORY

In framing this issue it is important to identify the historical importance of the Islamic ideology on the subcontinent. Whilst many will pinpoint the advent of the importance of such an ideology with the struggle to create Pakistan in the early 20th century, one can trace the roots of Islamic ideology back to the times of the British Raj. Education has always been the central tool by which to propagate ideology and during the British Raj madrasa education was used to create an Islamic identity which stood in contrast with a more secular way of life. The madrasa system of education was in fact a direct response to the perceived challenges by the British/Western colonial rule to Islamic philosophy and seen as an alternative for Muslims who did not have access to the British imperial education. Although at the time madrassas did not preach militancy and instead focused on subjects such as philosophy, mathematics and astronomy along with religious studies, 'they reinforced old conflicts and caused new divisions among Muslims at the political, cultural and educational levels.'ⁱⁱⁱ Madrassas and religious schools of thought were thus divided between those that sought to incorporate the more progressive elements of the British Raj, such as Aligarh in Uttar Pradesh and the more rigid and inward

looking movements that had a distinct anti imperial/Western sentiments and rejected any syllabi or reform that was attributed to western thought, such as the madrassas of Deoband.

During the confrontation with the British, the Deobandi ulema institutionalised the madrassa system, and gave it an administrative and academic structure. They adopted Dars-e-Nizami, but only after overturning its emphasis on non-religious studies... The madrassa system was thus formalised under the influence of the same foreign culture it was defending itself against. In addition to Persian and Arabic, madrassas adopted Urdu, introduced examinations, printing presses, loudspeakers, textbooks, uninterrupted residence, fixed duration of study, and networks of schools. Since then, madrassas have followed this paradoxical pattern of resistance to state authority and modernity, coupled with a selective use of new subjects, techniques and technology.^{iv}

The conservative Muslims at the time of the British Raj reacted to what was perceived as an attack on the Muslim way of life and this manifested itself in the two kinds of madrassa movements described above. In both though, the perceived challenges to religion and traditional society by a government system that was increasingly centralized and powerful and the integration of people from different societies and religions into an almost homogenous society were of particular importance in starting conservative religious movements.

Later the Aligarh movement became the blueprint for government schools in Pakistan and the madrassas of the colonial times led to modern day madrassas in Pakistan. On the subcontinent therefore, the struggle between a more enlightened and secular education system against the more conservative and often radical religious education system is nothing new. Although the struggle has intensified in present day Pakistan and today goes well beyond the education sector, its roots and rationale can be traced back to colonial India and the role of British imperial education.^v

IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

Today one of the most prominent issues in Pakistani society is indeed its increased islamisation. However beyond the domestic debate of which Islam and what role for Islam, foreign policy has come to play a role in the increased popular support for Islam. Over the last decade western politics and press have started to vilify islamisation and in the west today it is often read as

going hand in hand with fundamentalism. Needless to say this is a gross oversimplification of the political and religious issues in Pakistan and other Muslim countries. Since 9/11 and the start of the 'war on terror', the international community has watched with growing alarm as Islam and Islamic ideology have helped rally and unify Muslim societies who fear that they are under threat from the West. The natural reaction has been to ask governments of Islamic states to show clearly where their allegiances lie. In Pakistan the battle lines were drawn immediately after 9/11 as Musharraf was asked to decide whether he was with or against America as the fight against the Taliban began in Afghanistan. Whilst this foreign allegiance put Pakistan in the camp of the 'good' with regard to the West, it created an impossible problem on the domestic front. Pakistani society is a deeply religious one where the state has struggled since independent to decide what role Islam should play in the public domain. Created as a secular state by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, it was still conceived as a homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent.^{vi} The tension around the role of religion in society has been exacerbated regularly by foreign policy crises, such as the Iranian revolution (which led to a more prominent Shia movement in Pakistan), the increased migration of Pakistani labourers to the Gulf (which has created a wealthier and more vocal Sunni community) or the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan (which in turn led to the US financing madrassas whose students were to fight communism). The increased islamisation measures under General Zia described below put religion firmly into the public domain with both the education and the legal system completely overhauled and islamised. It also defined Islam in Pakistan as Sunni Islam, creating the sectarian divisions which claim so many lives today. The struggle to put religion back into the private domain has been going on ever since the post Zia period. Yet today this seems a lost battle as yet another foreign policy crisis has brought about the question of the role of religion in Pakistani society. As America's war on terror seems to dictate Pakistan's foreign policy and increasingly seeps into domestic policy^{vii}, the Pakistani population is increasingly rallying around Islam as an alternative identity to what is perceived as imposed westernisation and being a lackey to the US government. Growing islamisation has in this case to be seen (yet again) as a direct reaction to the external influence of a neo imperialist power.

This rallying around religion for the purpose of self definition is not solely an issue with Islam. It might help to remember that religious fundamentalism exists in the West as well. For example the creationist controversy which re-emerged in the aftermath of the Soviet Union launching Sputnik into space in 1957 before an embarrassed America. According to Mike Apple who refers back to this time, it was

(..)the threat that this perceived constellation posed to conservative Christians led many of them to harden their positions. Retreating ever more to a literal reading of the Bible, they became even more stronger in their position that the task was not to accommodate Bible into science, but to fit science into inerrant readings of Genesis...the reason for this robust revival...undoubtedly have multiple causes: Cold War fears, the threats to traditional beliefs by the growth of science, the centralization of power within federal structures, the decline of local community sensibilities given the suburbanization of populations and increased geographical mobility, struggles over race and gender that seemed to some to threaten both family stability and “acceptable” roles and behaviors, the anger over racial integration, and so much more.^{xviii}

It is therefore important to remember that the current process of islamisation has origins in the colonial period and is neither an isolated incident not specific to Islam.

The paper will go on to discuss the state islamisation process under Zia which laid the foundation stone for today’s radicalisation, before turning to the education issue as an example of how Pakistani society today is using religion as a tool to define its national identity. The role of Madrassas in this process will also be analysed. The paper then turns to the role of Islamic parties and lastly to Musharraf’s increasingly difficult position with regard to the war on terror.

THE DOMESTIC PRIORITY – ISLAM TO BIND TOGETHER A NATION

The domestic ramifications of Pakistan’s islamisation process can only be understood when looking at the Zia era. When general Zia-ul-Haq took over with the 1977 coup, his first drive was the islamisation of all sections of Pakistani society. Largely this was to justify his political legitimacy as a military dictator who had removed the democratically elected leader from power. But in part this islamisation programme and quest for a radical Islamic national identity for Pakistan were also to bind together a nation which was still being torn apart by internal issues of regionalism as well as being influenced by foreign policy issues emanating from Iran and Afghanistan. In his first address to the nation, he declared that Islamic laws would be enforced and that earnest attention would be devoted towards establishing the Islamic society for which Pakistan had been created. He wanted to bring the legal, social, economic and political institutions of the country in conformity with the Islamic principles, values and traditions in the

light of the Quran and Sunnah, to enable the people of Pakistan to lead their lives in accordance to Islam. This was a totally new concept of Pakistani national identity, a 180 degree turn from Jinnah's original vision.

A number of steps were taken to eradicate non-Islamic practices. He introduced Zakat, Ushr, Islamic Hudood and Penal Code. The National Education Policy and Implementation Programme (GoP 1979) set out to islamise the youth by giving textbooks of all subjects (including the sciences and mathematics) a religious orientation. The teaching of Islamic Studies and Arabic were made compulsorily for B.A., B.Sc., Engineering, M.B.B.S., Commerce, Law and Nursing students. For professional studies, extra marks were given to people who were Hafiz-e-Quran^{ix}. The aims of the new education system were to be in conformity with the principles of Islam. Zia's islamisation programme was based on the ideals of Maulana Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, who also had influenced reforms in Saudi Arabia. The new education policy wanted to create an awareness of universal Muslim brotherhood amongst students, making them feel a part of the Ummah, the universal Muslim brotherhood. Despite this, English medium schools were not banned and the private sector expanded rapidly catering for the more affluent middle and upper classes and creating in effect a two track society.

During the same period Pakistan became a US ally in the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. This resulted in the state promotion of madrassas through governmental financial support.^x In effect Islam was being harnessed to fight the evil of the day – communism. But the role of the mosque school went much further than that. Madrassas were to be used to expand the primary education system. Every village mosque which had space was encouraged to open a primary school which would be run by two teachers – the imam and a regular primary school teacher. The curriculum was to be the same as that in other primary schools allowing for the easy transfer to the formal education system of any student who wanted to.

The mosque will be accorded its rightful place. Five thousand mosque schools will be opened...^{xi}

Zia was aware of the discrepancies in an education system led in part by the state and in part by the mosque and pushed for the integration of both systems so that there would be one Islamic vision. Since that time the Pakistani state has increasingly relied on the madrassa system as an alternative to the state funded public one. The increases of madrassas and private

schools have allowed the state to renege its responsibility in educating the Pakistani masses and consequently the state education system has withered.

Zia's islamisation process went against the grain of the people who were religious in their personal, yet not necessarily in their public lives. An unexpected outcome was further division of Pakistani society - by relying on a policy grounded in Islam, the state fomented factionalism. By legislating what was Islamic and what was not, Islam itself could no longer provide unity because it was then being defined to exclude previously included groups. Disputes between Sunnis and Shi'a, ethnic disturbances in Karachi between Pakhtuns and Muhajirs, increased animosity toward Ahmadiyyas, and the revival of Punjab-Sindh tensions can all be traced to the loss of Islam as a common vocabulary.

THE EXAMPLE OF EDUCATION

One of the primary aims of education systems in modern states has always been the political socialisation of the younger generation. Education has been used as a political tool throughout the ages and across the whole world to define national identity and underlie the political rationale of regimes. Consequently the role that Islam was to play in Pakistan's education system was debated early on. Islam was seen as the binding force which would keep the different provinces united and give the Pakistani people a sense of national unity. Yet the secessions of Bangladesh in 1971 demanded a revisiting of the role played by Islam in Pakistan's national identity, especially since Islam had failed to keep the Eastern province attached as Bengali nationalism triumphed over the unifying power of religion. This resulted in the introduction of Islamiyat (the study of Islam) in schools under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. What was at first just an exercise in cementing national unity became a fundamentalist project after 1977. A further intensification of islamisation of social life in general, but the curriculum and the textbooks in particular took place under General Zia-ul-Haq, whereby Islamic references were included in all subjects including the sciences, the social sciences, Urdu and English. The legacy he left was never reversed, even in the years of non-military rule between 1989 and 1999.

Today the effects of Zia's times are still felt. A recent review of the content of Pakistan's curriculum and textbooks revealed that they are 'insensitive to the religious diversity of the Pakistani society and that Islamiyat is not solely taught as one subject but permeates the teaching of Urdu, English and Social Studies as well. Nayyar and Salim have found that 'much

of this material runs counter to any efforts of national integration.^{xii} There had been an attempt towards the end of the Nawaz Sharif Government to engender a reform process; however this was never followed through.^{xiii}

Under General Musharraf's government education reforms continue to encourage private sector investment in secondary and higher education. Currently there is a major curriculum review under way. USAID is supporting Pakistan's education reform with around 75 million dollars amongst which the Education Sector Reform Assistance (ESRA) focuses on education policy issues such as teaching methods to instil democratic attitudes. A madrassa regulation board has also been created to establish a network of model madrassas and regulate others. Today the role of Islam in education is again a hotly debated subject as the government tries to dismantle Zia's legacy.

However ESRA is seen at the national level as an American funded agency which is interfering in the Pakistani education system. Whilst Musharraf's call for the de-Islamisation of the curriculum early 2000 would not have had the support of the religious parties, it is now widely seen as a policy implemented on US orders. The issues of education for development and education for greater secularisation or democratisation have been blurred. The textbook and curriculum reform has now become embroiled in the issue of the role of religion in national identity and the westernisation from above debate. It is however important to remember that a textbook and curriculum reform became necessary largely because of the out of date or inappropriate content. Both the curriculum and the textbooks had been re-copied and re-printed since the Zia era with only minor changes. The new curriculum has some important new features. According to a number of educationalists who have seen it and an interview at the curriculum wing in Islamabad (April 2006) all references to Islam have been removed from all textbooks bar Pakistan Studies and Islamiyat. The pre-islamic history of the subcontinent has also been reinstated 30 years after it was truck from the curriculum.

However despite this hopeful note the new curriculum remains problematic. Being seen as an act of westernisation, the Islamic parties, but also more moderate not necessarily religious people have protested:

(In April 2004), Pakistan's education minister, Zubaida Jalal, was shouted out of parliament for suggesting changes to the current syllabus-changes including the

removal of some Koranic verses and substituting words that might be contributing to making Pakistan a less tolerant, militant minded society...other changes would have eased the vilification of Hindus and foreigners prevalent in many of the historical lessons. Jalal's explanation that the changes did not reflect an assault on Islamic ideology went unheard. Conservative clerics and members of the mainstream Pakistan Muslim League stormed out of the session, decrying the effort as part of Musharaff's plan to "Westernize" the country at the behest of Washington. "We will resist any and all attempts to turn this country into a secular state" vowed Liaqat Baloch, deputy parliamentary leader for the six party religious alliance United Action Forum." Student affiliated with the forum took to the streets in protest, circulated petitions, and called for criminal charges against those involved in the changes. Clerics lambasted the changes in their mosques, in the media and the streets.^{xiv}

It is therefore not surprising that at the Ministry of Education's 6th E – 9 Ministerial review meeting in 2006 the first two Objectives of Education for 1998-2010 still remain.

'Making the Qur'anic principles and Islamic practices as an integral part of curricula so that the message of Holy Qur'an could be disseminated in the process of education as well as training and Educating and training the future generation of Pakistan as true practising Muslims who would be able to enter the next millennium with courage, confidence, wisdom and tolerance.'^{xv}

De-islamisation is now hardly mentioned in public. It is now an open question if the new curriculum will survive and if Musharraf might have to choose between an alliance with the MMA (Islamic parties) or his secular reforms in light of the autumn 2007 elections. This is especially the case since in February 2007 the MMA protested in the National Assembly against the teaching of Pakistan's pre-Islamic History – a major reform from the Zia curriculum. Walking out with the alliance MMA member Farid Ahmad Piracha shouted: 'That may be your history, (but) ... our history (starts) from Makkah and Medinah'.^{xvi} During an interview^{xvii} the director of the Sindh Foundation explained that the curriculum was now perceived to be so 'western' that Sindh might be the only province to adopt it and that the other three provinces were likely to reject it.

THE MADRASSA ISSUE

Since 9/11 Madrassas have been portrayed as the vehicles for Islamic fundamentalism. However madrassas as such are not the problem. Madrassas provide religious education and free lodging, essentially for poor people and have been supplementing the state education system especially in rural areas for decades. The western understanding of madrassas in Pakistan evokes 'terrorist schools', as they were set up (and supported by US money) to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan and later provided the backbone to the Taliban regime. This highly oversimplified description does not apply to 90% of the madrassas across Pakistan as most of them teach children at primary level. There are different types of madrassas, most focusing on basic literacy and religious education, and very few, which serve as religious universities. They are divided along sectarian and political lines:

The two main branches of Sunni Islam in South Asia - Deobandi and Bareili - dominate this sector. Ahle Hadith/Salafi Muslims have their own schools, as do the Shias, while the predominantly Sunni Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) shuns sectarian tags and maintains madrassas distinct from the sectarian ones. The religious, doctrinal differences of these schools are irreconcilable.^{xviii}

Over one and a half million children attend madrassas. The exact number of madrassas is unknown: some surveys estimate 10,000, although it is acknowledged that the precise number may be much higher. 'At independence in 1947, there were only 137 madrassas in Pakistan. According to a 1956 survey, there were 244 madrassas in all of West Pakistan. Since then, even by official accounts, their number has doubled every ten years. A significant number remain unregistered'.^{xix} They all run largely on public philanthropy but according to Baxter a large number of madrassas also receive regular financial assistance from the publicly administered zakat funds.^{xx} Many were originally set up with money from Iran (Shia madrassas) and money from the gulf countries or the Pakistani diaspora working in the Gulf (Sunni madrassas). The expansion of the religious seminaries through village mosques was encouraged throughout the 1980s in order to makeup for the shortfall of primary schools in villages.

Madrassas impart knowledge through formal courses, which are taught in Arabic or Persian and are based on the medieval curriculum- students memorize texts without any real understanding

of either the language or the content. The texts serve as 'symbols of identity and continuity'. There are also Urdu textbooks, read by final year graduates. It is at that level that a certain degree of Islamic radicalisation takes place.

These are polemical texts that refute the beliefs of the other sub-sects of Islam as well as of modern ideas. Among the latter are capitalism, socialism, democracy, modernism and individualism. (...) Moreover, their arguments are simple and already familiar to them through the sermons of other mullahs. Thus, the clergy is engaged with the modern world but on its own terms and according to its perceptions of it. Being so actively engaged and having such beliefs about reform, the madrassas are not frozen in time; they want to take time into their own hands.^{xxi}

Some sections of the more orthodox Muslim sects have been radicalized by state sponsored exposure to jihad, first in Afghanistan, then in Kashmir'.^{xxii} Most clergies who teach and graduate from such seminaries have a constrained if not backward world view, often an incorrect understanding of the Quran, and an intolerant attitude towards issues considered western or incompatible with their own. Most of the books used are very old, some written between the eleventh and the seventeenth century, even for subjects such as logic and medicine.^{xxiii}

Although the madrassa education system has been subjected to constant criticism and evaluation by Muslim reformers, modernists, neo-fundamentalist revivalists, public policy makers and the ulema itself, little has been done in concrete terms to change the system as the structural parameters are left unchanged.

Madrassa education is also based on the belief that theological formulations and intellectual achievements of earlier Islamic scholars cannot be subjected to any critics or change and should be considered as a priori truth. It lacks empirical bases, critical insights, analytical tool, and creative content.^{xxiv}

It is not difficult to understand why parents, especially poor and uneducated would send their child to a madrassa: they are free and provide boarding and food for their pupils. Equally, if not more importantly, according to Ahmad madrassas education helps social mobility by ensuring access to employment:

It has been observed that while there is considerable unemployment among the youth educated in secular schools and colleges, the graduates of madrassas have never faced such problems and have usually been able to find jobs commensurate with their training. A survey in 1979 showed that among the graduates of the 1978 class of two major madrassas in Karachi and one in the NWFP, only 6% were still unemployed by the middle of 1979.^{xxv}

Some madrassas at secondary level teach students to believe in the cause of sectarian and international jihad. The Islamic notion of Muslim Brotherhood or what is known as the Muslim Ummah and Islamic emphasis of the solidarity of such an Ummah is used as a tool to encourage them to take up causes in other Muslim regions/countries as there own as well as Muslim grievances in Western countries, causes that may be real or imagined. Pakistan's religious schools are no more threatening or extremist than ones that exist in other countries, for example in India. The only difference is this notion of the solidarity of the Muslim Ummah and jihad has been used to provoke Pakistani and other jihadis to then wage in different parts of the world such as Afghanistan and Kashmir.

After international attacks such as 9/11 and 7/7, there has been pressure on the Pakistani government to rein in militant extremists. Today Musharraf's government is tied to the support of the Islamic MMA who stand opposed to the education reform process and the regulation of madrassas. Despite this the government has pledged to change the status of such madrassas and to regulate through a madrassa regulation board in accordance with the anti terrorism mission in compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1973. However the Bill asks madrassas to comply with the new policies 'voluntarily', in that no provisions are made to coerce or force institutions that do not comply with government regulations. The clergy being opposed to the new Bill, the government is finding it hard to implement and has resorted to offer free Islamic and modern textbooks and other rewards, including salaries for teachers. Most madrassas however have said they will resist any attempts to secularise education. The religious organisations already banned by the government continue to run schools and to produce militant literature. The only concrete step the government has taken is to expel foreign students without no-objection certificates (NOCs) from their own countries.^{xxvi}

THE ROLE OF ISLAMIC PARTIES AND THE RISE OF SECTARIAN VIOLENCE

Traditionally, the religious parties in Pakistan have won under 5% of the national vote. But in 2002, against the backdrop of the American-led offensive in Afghanistan, the radicals achieved 11% and formed the local governments in North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan.

Rise of Islamic parties and the MMA (*to be expanded*)

The politicisation of the sectarian divide between Shia and Sunnis lies again in Pakistan's foreign policy^{xxvii} - in the Iranian revolution (a revolution made for export and whereby both money and propaganda material was exported from Iran to Pakistan to empower the Shia minority estimated to be between 8 and 20% of Pakistan's population) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Iranian revolution led to an increase in the establishment of Shia madrassas and the heightened profile of the Pakistani Shia population led to an identity crisis with regard to the role of Islam. Zia's drive for a Sunni islamisation in the late 1970s and early 1980s was driven in part as a response to this and in part as a response to the war in Afghanistan whereby Sunni Islam was being harnessed to fight the Soviets and which ultimately led to the creation of the Taliban. The state used madrassas to strengthen the Sunni population in light of what was seen as the 'Shia problem'. It also led to the cornerstone of Zia's islamisation of Pakistani society which has been discussed above. The intent on trying to define 'which' Islam was the right one for Pakistan and 'which' Islam was to unify the different provinces Zia managed exactly the opposite – he divided the nation on sectarian lines. The sectarian clashes have always cost the lives of many, but as Nasr observes – the spectacular rise of sectarian violence over the last two decades has morphed into 'a form of politics of identity'.^{xxviii}

It has metamorphosed from religious shism into political conflict around mobilisation of communal identity. It has found a political function, and the militant forces that represent it operate in the political rather than religious arena.^{xxix}

The increase politicisation of the sectarian violence is just another aspect of increased islamisation.

Musharraf on a tight rope – the war on terror vs the religion of a nation (to be expanded)

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to disassociate the Islamic ideology from the Pakistani subconscious, considering that Pakistan was a country created for 'Muslims'. Pakistan consequently adopted a very exclusive identity where the allegiance of the state lay first with its Muslim inhabitants and then its non Muslim inhabitants. Early post partition leaders correctly understood that the only way to bring the variety of different groups together under one identity could only be through the call of Islam. Religion has therefore played a pivotal role from before the inception of Pakistan till present times, *not because the people advocated a religious call* but because the elite exploited the religious sentiments of the masses, when everything else failed to hold the groups together. Where religion, in the sense of being a common factor, has failed to hold different groups together, it has been used to gather support from Western allies by labelling dissenting groups or provinces, such as the Balochis, as Taliban sympathizers and/or supporters. Madrassas then act as political instrument used by political leaders and are seen by most citizens as the only honest defender of Islamic morals and values.

ⁱ The author would like to thank Selina Adam Khan who helped in the compilation of secondary sources during the summer of 2006.

ⁱⁱ Haqqani, H (2005) Pakistan between Mosque and Military, Lahore, Vanguard books.

ⁱⁱⁱ ICG, p.10.

^{iv} ICG, p. 10.

^v ICG, p. 11.

^{vi} See Jinnah's speech on August 11th 1947; Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah's Speeches as Governor General of Pakistan, 1947-48, Karachi, GoP, 1964.

^{vii} See the section on the education reform later

^{viii} Apple, p. 131.

^{ix} Hafiz-e-Quran are people who have memorized the Quran.

^x ICG Asia report number 36, 2002

^{xi} The Pakistan Times, October 13th 1978 cited in Salim and Khan, 2004, p.27

^{xii} Nayyar and Salim, 2004

^{xiii} See National Curriculum 2000, a conceptual framework – written by Sami Mistaffa for the ministry of Education in Islamabad, October 1999.

^{xiv} Pakistan's inner battle for education reform. Fight pits as rivals progressive forces and old-school religious factions, San Francisco Chronicle, May 30th, 2004.

^{xv} Country Report on Policies and Systems for the Assessment of Education, Ministry of Education's 6th E – 9 Ministerial review meeting, 13-15 February 2006, Mexico, p.13

^{xvi} Asghar, R. MMA against teaching pre-Islamic history, Dawn, 22.2.2007.

^{xvii} September 2006, Sindh Foundation, Karachi

^{xviii} ICG, p.6

^{xix} ICG, P.7.

^{xx} Baxter, p. 185

^{xxi} Baxter, 2004, p. 181.

^{xxii} ICG Asia Report, No. 36.

^{xxiii} Baxter, 2000, p. 185.

^{xxiv} Baxter, 2000, p. 187

^{xxv} Baxter, 2000, p. 186.

^{xxvi} At the time, there were 700 foreign students studying in such madrassas; half of them did not have NOCs and were therefore sent back to their countries. Dawn, 09/08/06

^{xxvii} The foreign policy origins of Pakistani sectarian violence is actually really complicated and involves Saudi Arabia's involvement due to the Afghan war, Iraqi involvement due to the Iran-Irak war and US involvement due to the Soviet invasion. More details can be found in Nasr (below) and Rachid, A., Pakistan: Trouble Ahead, Trouble Behind, Current History, Vol 95, n600, April 1996.

^{xxviii} Nasr, S.V.R Islam, the state and the rise of sectarian militancy in Jaaffrelot (ed) Pakistan Nation, Nationalism and the state, Vanguard, Lahore 2002

^{xxix} Nasr, p.86